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Abstract
Exposure to violence can shape people’s political and social perceptions. War-time effects on
trust in state institutions are particularly relevant for political stability in the aftermath of violent
conflict. If people distrust the state, they are less likely to endorse reform plans, will be less
inclined to comply with state rules and regulations, and may uphold support for challengers of
state authority. Our paper contributes to the understanding of the role of violence for trust in
the national government. We use high-quality, geo-referenced survey data, joined with village-level
information on civil war casualties, to estimate the effects of exposure to violence on political
trust in Nepal. We find that exposure to violence matters for reducing trust in the national gov-
ernment. This association seems to be mainly driven by effects of violence at the outbreak of the
conflict as well as at the end of the civil war period under investigation. These findings shed new
light on the complex associations between exposure to violence and political trust.
Keywords
Civil war, Nepal, political trust, violence
Introduction
Postwar countries are economically weaker, display lower levels of socio-economic develop-
ment and have higher risks of renewed violent conflict than other countries (Chen et al.,
2008). The material causes are well known: civil wars destroy infrastructure, weaken institu-
tions and absorb scarce financial resources (Collier et al., 2008; Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol,
2003). The immaterial impact of violence has received considerably less attention. Exposure
to political violence can affect collective norms, as well as individual social and political
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attitudes. Notably, it may shape how people perceive the state and its institutions. Such con-
sequences of civil war are harder to capture and analyze empirically. However, they can be
crucial for the prospects of stabilization in the direct aftermath of violence, as well as for
long-term economic, social and political development of postwar countries.
In this paper we add to the understanding of such legacies of violence. Particularly, we are
interested in the impact of civil war violence on political trust. Whether people trust in the state
is not only shaped by pre-war allegiances or by socio-economic characteristics of the postwar
context. The war itself shapes people’s perceptions. Varying experiences with violence in war-
time might have an impact on how people perceive the state. We argue that exposure to vio-
lence has important effects on trust in the national government. Violent conflict is a blatant sign
of the government’s inability to uphold its monopoly over the use of violence and to protect cit-
izens from physical harm. Moreover, government action in war zones often leads to direct and
collateral physical and human losses among the local population, affecting their perception of
the state. We expect these dynamics to negatively impact people’s trust in the national govern-
ment and we believe that these effects are particularly pronounced in the direct aftermath of
civil wars, before any meaningful political reforms and peace-building activities are underway.
Recently, various studies have been investigating the effects of violence and victimization
on individual political and social perceptions and behavior (Bellows and Miguel, 2009;
Cassar et al., 2011). However, these analyses feature a couple of shortcomings with respect
to the research interest of this study: first, most research focuses on issues of social capital,
as well as generalized or inter-personal trust, neglecting the political dimension of trust; sec-
ond, the majority of the studies rely on surveys and social games that have been undertaken
years after the end of the war. Thus, patterns of political trust in the most volatile, direct
aftermath of civil wars remain under-investigated.
Our paper fills some of these gaps. We analyze the effects of exposure to civil war violence
on political trust in Nepal. We use data that have, to the best of our knowledge, not been used
for comparable analyses before: the World Health Survey (WHS) was carried out during a
brief period of peace in 2003 following the peak of violence of the Nepalese civil war. It con-
tains information on political attitudes as well as the exact location of more than 8500 respon-
dents. This allows us to match the data with information on war-time violence on Nepal’s
smallest administrative level and to compute levels of exposure to civil war violence for all
respondents. To strengthen inference, we consider a comprehensive list of individual- and
village-level covariates and district-level fixed effects in our estimations. Furthermore, we
implement an instrumental variables analysis that leverages the geographic location of respon-
dents as a source of exogenous variation in the total exposure to violence. Our analysis, in
contrast to some previous studies, finds that exposure to violence reduces political trust.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses existing work on
political trust. In Section 3 we develop an argument about the effects of exposure to violence.
Section 4 provides context on the Nepalese civil war. We present our empirical research
design and data in Section 5 and main findings in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and dis-
cusses implications for further research.
Political trust and why it matters
The aftermath of violent conflict is marked by volatility, transition and uncertainty. The war-
ring parties’ motives and strategies are unknown, the reliability of the government’s promises of
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economic and political reform is hard to assess, and contradictory information and assessments
by various political actors cannot be verified. At the same time a great deal is at stake for the
population: people might have high expectations with regard to the improvement of their living
conditions, worry about potential political and economic disadvantages and fear for their physi-
cal security in case armed conflict recurs. How people behave in such situations of uncertainty
will, among other things, be shaped by their perceptions of the political actors involved.
Thus, political trust can be considered particularly relevant in postwar societies. People’s
trust in the state reflects their judgment as to whether the state and its institutions and actors
are motivated to deliver on their promises and to act in the interest of the people (Levi and
Sacks, 2009; Sacks and Larizza, 2012). In the words of Miller and Listhaug (1990), political
trust is the ‘‘judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political incumbents are
responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny’’.1
Pathologically low levels of political trust among large parts of the population may under-
mine the implementation of peace agreements as well as the implementation of essential
reforms; it may reduce citizens’ compliance with laws and regulations and increase the risk
of violent conflict recurrence.
Reforms lead to political change that can produce winners and losers. People will resist
governmental reform plans if they do not believe that they will profit adequately in absolute
or relative (compared with other groups) terms. Their appraisal of reforms will strongly be
influenced by their level of trust in the institutions and actors that propose these reforms
(Chanley et al., 2000). The more people distrust the state and incumbents, the more they will
fear to lose from any reform and the more likely they will be to reject plans for necessary
economic, social or political change.
Furthermore, empirical research indicates that people are less likely to comply with govern-
ment regulations if they mistrust state institutions (Levi and Stoker, 2000). It seems plausible
that people will be reluctant to bear the costs of duties as citizens when they feel that the gov-
ernment cannot be trusted (Levi et al., 2009). Studies demonstrate that a lack of confidence in
state institutions can undermine peoples’ willingness to pay taxes (Fjeldstad, 2004). Low trust
levels may also compel people to avert other forms of rules and regulations: from allocation of
resources, over rulings of the judiciary, to the state’s claims over the monopoly of force.
People have supported violence in the first place because of specific motives—may it be
grievances stemming from discrimination, hope for economic gains or out of ideological
resistance against specific policies. In many cases at least some of these motives will still be
present when violence ends. If it does not seem believable to the people that the state is com-
mitted to act on their grievances and to consider their political, social or economic claims,
they will be more likely to be willing to support renewed violence against the state
(Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). Thus, lack of political trust may motivate (renewed) violent
action against a state that is not perceived to act in one’s own interests. This dynamic is
especially relevant in the context of immediate postwar bargains in which trust plays an
essential role for the successful implementation of peace agreements or the re-establishment
of the monopoly of violence by the state.
The legacy of war—effects of violence on perceptions and behavior
If political trust can play such an important role for stability after violent conflicts, it is
important to understand what factors increase or reduce it. Previous research has found that
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various economic, political and socio-economic factors can impact people’s political trust
(Askvik, 2008; Catterberg and Moreno, 2006; Gilley, 2006; McAllister, 1999; Zerfu et al.,
2008). Whereas we will consider some of these factors in our own analysis, we want to focus
on a variable that can be considered particularly relevant in postwar countries: exposure to
violence.
Various studies investigate how individual victimization affects people’s political and
social behavior. For example, analyses by Bellows and Miguel (2009) in Sierra Leone show
that individuals whose households directly experienced more intense war violence are more
likely to attend community meetings and join local political and community groups.
Similarly, Blattman (2009) finds that war-time witnessing of violence increases community
leadership among ex-combatants in Uganda. Using results from social games and a survey
undertaken in Tajikistan, Cassar et al. (2011) find that self-reported victimization is nega-
tively associated with trust in people within the same village and positively with trust in citi-
zens from distant regions. In their analysis of the effects of war-time experience on social
and economic behavior in postwar Burundi, Voors et al. (2012) find consistent evidence that
violence exposure increases altruistic behavior and risk-seeking and decreases patience with
respect to inter-temporal choices (see Callen et al., 2014, for other results on violence expo-
sure and risk preference). De Luca and Verpoorten (2012) analyze the effects of civil war
violence on generalized trust and associational membership. Their results indicate a decrease
in social capital in districts exposed to battle events. Using similar data but a different empiri-
cal strategy, Rohner et al. (2013) also find negative effects of violence on generalized trust.
Gilligan et al. (2014) find that members of communities with greater exposure during Nepal’s
civil war are more likely to contribute to public goods and are significantly more trusting.
Using survey data from northern Afghanistan, Weidmann and Zuercher (2013) do not find
evidence for the hypothesis that wartime violence leads to an increase in social cohesion.
Social capital as well as interpersonal and generalized trust are essential for political and
social recovery. As argued in the previous section, we believe, however, that people’s percep-
tions of national level institutions—their trust in the state—is equally important but has
received much less scholarly attention. Results of the few studies that consider the effects of
violence on political attitudes and political participation yield contradictory results:
Blattmann (2009) as well as Bellows and Miguel (2009) find that exposure to violence
increases voting. In their analyses of the determinants of political trust in Sierra Leone,
Sacks and Larizza demonstrate that respondents who live in areas that were particularly
affected by the war are more likely to view their local government councilors as trustworthy
(Sacks and Larizza, 2012). Performing similar analyses but focusing on trust in central state
institutions, Bakke et al. (2012) do not find any significant association between victimization
and trust in president and parliament in Abkhazia. Hutchison and Johnson (2011) analyze
how violent conflict affects country-level political trust levels. They find significant detri-
mental effects of political violence on political trust. Similarly, a recent study by Gates and
Justesen (2013) finds that political violence by Tuaregs against the Malian state had negative
effects on people’s trust in the national president.
Diverging findings of these studies may be attributed to differences across cases and meth-
odological approaches. We argue, however, that a specific issue is of particular relevance
beyond individual empirical strategies. Surveys and behavioral games in Abkhazia (Bakke et
al., 2012) and Tajikistan (Cassar et al., 2011) were done more than 10 years after the end of
the respective armed conflicts. The studies on Sierra Leone use data that were collected two
to three years after the end of the civil war. Hutchison and Johnson investigate effects of
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violent conflicts on political trust in the following year. Gates and Justesen (2013) investigate
the direct attitudinal effects of a single attack in an ongoing long-term conflict rather than of
actual exposure to political violence over a specific period of time. Thus, these studies differ
substantially with respect to the specific postwar or post-violence phase in which the respec-
tive analyses take place.
Associations between exposure to violence and individual perceptions may, however,
change over time: thus, the stage of postwar recovery at which trust is measured may play a
pivotal role for the respective empirical findings. More specifically, associations between vio-
lence and trust may be affected by peace-building activities after violent conflicts. The end
of a civil war opens up space for processes that support coping with previous experiences of
violence—through formal mechanisms of truth and reconciliation, community-based inter-
ventions for social healing or individual psycho-social support programs. Moreover, while
violence may be a defining element of state–society interactions during war-time, other
aspects, such as direct or indirect political participation or access to public basic services,
may develop to become more essential during peace-time. The more time has passed since
the end of a civil war the more previous experiences of violence may lose in importance as
compared with more recent postwar state–society interactions. De Luca and Verpoorten
(2012) lend some support to such a time-dependency—they find evidence for short-term neg-
ative associations between violence and social capital followed by processes of recovery after
the end of violence.
With regard to timing, most previous studies on the effects of violence on trust focus on
the longer-term effects of violence, rather than on perceptions in the immediate aftermath of
civil wars. Doubtlessly, postwar social, economic and political recovery is a long-term pro-
cess. Many countries relapse into civil strife many years after previous civil war had been
ended. Thus, studying the long-term effects of civil wars is of high relevance for understand-
ing prerequisites for successful peace-building. As argued above, we believe, however, that
associations between exposure to violence and political trust are equally important in imme-
diate postwar situations, where political fragility and volatility are particularly high and
where essential but delicate political and institutional change is to be initiated—for example,
elections, political reform and reconciliation. Contrary to longer-term effects of violence, the
role of violence for political trust in the aftermath of violence has barely been touched upon.
Our paper aims at filling some of this gap of previous research: we investigate the role of
civil war violence on political trust using information on village-level intensity of violence
and survey data that were collected during a brief cessation of fighting in the Nepalese civil
war. This allows us to investigate associations between the exposure to civil-war violence and
political trust in the direct aftermath of a ceasefire.
Our main argument is intuitive but in contradiction to previous studies that find positive
associations between exposure to violence and trust. We argue that observing civil war vio-
lence and the state’s inability to end it exerts negative effects on people’s trust in the state.
The inability of the government to uphold the monopoly of violence or alternatively address
underlying grievances that drive opposition to the state communicates low competence.
Spectators will downgrade their assessment of the government. Living in areas affected by
substantial violence increases the risk that people perceive the state not only as unable to
provide security, but also as an actual security threat in itself. The local population suffers
from unintended consequences of counter-insurgency campaigns, such as collateral damage
to local infrastructure or physical injuries and death resulting from military encounters of
state actors and rebel forces. Moreover, in many civil wars state agents commit massive
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human rights abuses themselves—as a means to enforce local support, extract information
or deter support of rebel movements (Kalyvas, 2006). Again, we believe that exposure to
such state action will reduce people’s trust in the government. Measuring levels of trust
directly after a ceasefire allows us to investigate such associations before postwar social and
political processes begin to change the relationship between exposure to violence and politi-
cal trust. Thus, we expect a negative association between exposure to violence and trust in
the national government, leading us to our main hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Exposure to civil war violence decreases political trust in the aftermath of civil war.
The civil war in Nepal 1996–2003
Nepal serves as a case study for our empirical analysis. More specifically, we focus on the
period from the beginning of armed conflict in 1996 until the cease fire in 2003. The truce
was accompanied by negotiations between Maoist rebels and the Nepalese government.
Even though the dialogue eventually broke down and violence resumed, the brief period of
peace may be understood as a critical postwar stage, where political trust plays a particularly
important role in the sense described above. Thus, we are interested in how the previous
period of violence shaped people’s perception of the Nepalese government in the seven
month period of peace and negotiations. Before we proceed with the description of the data
we use and the analysis we perform, we will briefly describe the context of the conflict and
the warring parties. As all our analyses focus on the period from 1996 to 2003, accounts will
be confined to this phase of the civil war.
Various economic, political and social aspects have been emphasized as causal factors that
lead to the civil war. Nepal’s economic performance was marked by widespread poverty and
pronounced regional economic disparities. Some of the areas where the insurgency set off
had been excluded from development activities and ranked among the poorest across the
country. This has led some observers to emphasize the role of absolute and relative depriva-
tion for the political violence that raged through the country (Graham, 2007; Murshed and
Gates, 2005; Riaz and Basu, 2007). Others have highlighted the role of political dynamics. In
the early 1990s widespread popular protest made the government accept the establishment of
a constitutional monarchy. Ensuing reforms, however, failed to bring about substantial polit-
ical change. The first elections in 1991 did not fulfill expectations for the new democracy with
respect to redistribution of power. Moreover, the newly established system has proven incap-
able of balancing diverging interests and demands by peaceful means. Evolving Maoist polit-
ical activities were suppressed, fueling the creation of the insurgency (Gersony et al., 2003;
Kumar, 2005). Finally, the ethnic dimension of the conflict has been stressed: the Maoists
have emphasized their aim of fighting against political and economic inequalities along reli-
gious, ethnic and caste differences. This narrative has contributed to mobilization in the light
of inequalities between minority groups and the dominant high-caste Hindus (Kumar, 2005;
Murshed and Gates, 2005). As is the case in many other violent conflicts, it was most proba-
bly a complex interplay of various of these factors that led to the outbreak of civil war in
1996.
The civil war has its roots in a rural area in the northwestern part of the country, namely
the Rolpa and Rukum districts. From this heartland, the conflict diffused throughout the
country (Gersony et al., 2003). Violence began in 1996 with attacks by the Maoists on police
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posts in rural areas. This is a strategy that was the focus of Maoist activists until 2001, a
period during which the rebels were able to install themselves across most parts of the coun-
try. Peace talks that aimed at ending the conflict broke down towards the end of 2001, when
the Maoists unilaterally withdrew from the talks and launched attacks on police and army
posts. As a consequence, a national state of emergency was declared, the national army
began a massive counter-insurgency campaign and the conflict rapidly increased in intensity
(Pettigrew, 2004). By 2002 the conflict had reached the highest level since its beginning in
1996.
The increase in conflict intensity was accompanied by ongoing political instability of the
national government. In 2002 the parliament was dissolved along with all elected bodies at
the local level, a move that may be traced back to political competition internal to the gov-
erning Congress Party (International Crisis Group, 2003). Elections were originally sched-
uled for the end of 2002. However, the Maoists declared that they would boycott the polls
and call for a national strike on election day. More generally, elections were virtually impos-
sible to organize in many regions of the war-ravaged country. Eventually, in October 2002
the king dismissed the government and assumed executive rights by himself (Gersony et al.,
2003; International Crisis Group, 2003). He swiftly began a peaceful dialogue with the
Maoists that led to the declaration of a mutual ceasefire in January 2003.
Even before the actual outbreak of the civil war, the state was marked by fragility and vir-
tual absence in various sectors and regions of the country (Riaz and Basu, 2007). The
national army had long been a well-respected institution; however, it was also rather ill-
equipped and trained. More importantly, it was responsible for a large number of human
rights abuses. Numerous incidents of extra-judicial detainment and killings have been
reported. The majority of the deaths during the conflict were a result of government counter-
insurgency activities. State agents have often been perceived as acting randomly. In many
areas government troops were feared even more than the Maoist rebels (International Crisis
Group, 2003; Pettigrew and Adhikari, 2009). Nonetheless, from 2002 on, despite its brutality
and resulting alienation of many civilians, the army was also perceived by many as being able
to shift the battle with the Maoists in its own favor (Gersony et al., 2003).
The following analysis aims at contributing to our understanding of how people’s expo-
sure to violence has shaped their perceptions toward the national government.
Research design, data and model specification
Data and operationalization
To test our hypothesis we rely on high-quality survey and administrative data from Nepal.
Our dependent variable of interest is political trust in the national government.
Operationalization and measurement are based on data from the WHS by the World Health
Organization. The WHS consists of a series of similar nationally representative surveys that
were implemented across 70 countries. The respective questionnaires focus on health issues
and aim at compiling comprehensive information on the health of populations and the per-
formance of health systems. However, they also comprise items related to respondents’ eco-
nomic situation and political perceptions. Most importantly for our purposes, the survey
also contains information on the exact geo-location of the respondents. The WHS generally
targets all members of the population aged 18 years or older living in private households.
Households are then selected based on a random, stratified sampling procedure. Finally,
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one adult member of each household is selected randomly for the interview—based on a
Kish table method. All interviews are conducted face-to-face.
The WHS in Nepal was conducted between February and August 2003. The individual
level response rate was 98%. The final dataset comprises interviews of 8822 households and
covers 62 out of 75 Nepalese districts. Some districts have been omitted owing to inaccessibil-
ity or conflict. This selection implies that we do not have any respondents from regions with
the most extreme levels of exposure to civil war violence. Nonetheless, the survey covered
many areas exposed to intermediate levels of violence. Assessing the raw data on casualties
across districts covered by the WHS survey, the total casualty count ranges from a minimum
of zero to a maximum of 22 per year, with a mean of 2.2 and standard deviation of 3.45. For
the full sample of village development committees (VDCs), including the worst affected dis-
tricts excluded from the WHS sampling, the violence count ranges to a maximum of 55, with
a mean of 1.53 and a standard deviation of 3.4. In other words, while the WHS did not sam-
ple from districts with the most extreme exposure to violence, it also did not sample some of
the least affected districts either. Overall, we believe that the WHS sample should inform us
in a meaningful way on the effects of violence on trust for large parts of the Nepalese popula-
tion. At worst, excluding the most affected regions will bias us against finding strong effects
for violence because we are losing exactly the respondents who suffered the most during the
civil war.
The final dataset contains information on respondents from 329 out of Nepal’s 3857 vil-
lages. The item nonresponse rate varies greatly across various sections of the survey—they
are highest for items on household expenditures (. 30%) and health insurance (. 20%),
but well below 10% for most sections of the survey and\1% for the items on political trust
that this paper is particularly interested in.
We use the following survey item as an as indicator for trust in the national government:
‘‘How much of the time do you think you can trust the NATIONAL government to do what
is right?’’2 Figure 1 displays the variation across the five possible answers.
The distribution of answers indicates that more than half of all respondents in the survey
(4964) express never or hardly ever trusting the national government, illustrating the precar-
ious support that national institutions had in Nepal during the ceasefire. For our analysis we
rely on an inverted version of the Likert-scaled survey item, which assigns higher numerical
values to higher levels of trust in the national government.
Our main independent variable is the local exposure to civil war violence. We use count
data on the number of total killings per VDC. Information is taken from the Informal Sector
Services Center (INSEC), a Nepalese non-profit human rights organization. These data con-
tain information on the total number of killings by Maoists and government forces in the
years 1996–2003 for each VDC. Note that the number of killings includes fatalities of the
two factions’ troops, as well as civilian killings. We focus on the absolute number of killings
from 1997 to 2002, because we believe that this fits more closely with the theoretical argu-
ment.3 The effects of violence on political trust in national-level institutions is driven not so
much by differences in relative levels, but by the absolute level of violence witnessed by the
local population. For additional robustness checks though, we also use the total number of
killings in each VDC, normalized by VDC population size.
To estimate a respondent’s direct exposure to the level of killings per capita, we use the
longitude and latitude information contained in the WHS for each respondent and match
them to the appropriate districts and VDCs. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the exposure
to violence across respondents. The majority of respondents is from local communities that
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did not actually experience violence directly, but more than 40% were exposed to some form
of civil war violence in the 1996–2002 time period.
Figure 3 further illustrates the distribution of violence and respondents across the territory
of Nepal. It shows the broad coverage of the WHS across Nepal and how killings were con-
centrated within particular VDCs.
Alternative explanations and control variables
To identify our relevant control variables, we draw on previous research that has found vari-
ous political, economic and socio-economic factors to matter for people’s perception of state
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Figure 2. Exposure of WHS respondents to violence.
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institutions and actors. Even though we are not able to control for all factors that have been
emphasized in the past, we will consider aspects that seem particularly relevant to us and that
pose the danger of omitted variable bias.
The first variable we control for is village population size. Cross-national research has
shown that larger populations are more prone to experiencing violence (Fearon and Laitin,
2003), that is, VDC population size might affect the level of exposure to violence.
Our second control relates to basic services delivery. Ensuring access to basic services is
among the essential welfare functions of the state (Call, 2011). The state’s inability or unwill-
ingness to provide equitable access will be directly felt by the people and thus shape their atti-
tudes and actions toward the state (Askvik et al., 2011; Sacks and Larizza, 2012). We use a
measure from the WHS survey that records whether the household has access to piped water
or a public standpipe to proxy for government services provision. We also include a survey
item asking about access to electricity.4
Several studies emphasize the role of economic factors such as poverty and inequality for
trust (e.g. Finkel et al., 1989; Haggard, 1990). The underlying assumption is straightforward:
people will rather trust in the state if they are well off economically (Catterberg and Moreno,
2006; McAllister, 1999). In our empirical estimations we include two different variables.
First, we include the VDC level of income polarization, based on income data from the 1996
Nepal Living Standard Survey and expressed as an Esteban-Ray (1994) polarization index,
calculated by Nepal et al. (2011), which has also been found to correlate with violence during
the civil war. Second, we include a VDC poverty measure, the share of the local population
below the poverty line, also provided by Nepal et al. (2011).
People might rather trust in other people and institutions that belong to their own iden-
tity group. Zerfu et al. (2008) find that people who strongly identify with their own ethnic
groups display lower levels of generalized trust. This in turn might reduce people’s trust in
institutions that are controlled by members of other ethnic groups. Similarly, an analysis of
Figure 3. Total killings 1996–2002; darker shades show higher levels of killings and WHS respondent
locations are shown in black.
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post Apartheid South Africa (Askvik, 2008) finds that identities, notably peoples’ race, mat-
ter for institutional trust. To account for the potential effect of ethnicity and a rift between
the local population and the national elite, we include the percentage of Nepali speakers and
the percentage of the population belonging to a higher caste at the VDC level as controls.5
Research on the determinants of legitimacy and political trust has emphasized the role of
political participation. Respective analyses are based on the assumption that people will be
more likely to trust in the state if they are able to influence its policy (e.g. through elections)
(Carter and Castillo, 2011; Gilley, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 2001). To capture these effects
we include an additional dummy variable from the WHS survey on whether a respondent
voted in the 1999 national election. Importantly, this variable also serves as an indirect indi-
cator of prior levels of support for the national government because the Maoists actively dis-
couraged participation in the elections.
Finally, we consider conventional socio-economic indicators that might have an impact
on political trust. Notably, we use individual information from the WHS to account for
respondents’ age, gender and level of education.
There are other potential confounders that might impact rebel violence and levels of polit-
ical trust: more fine-grained aspects of government services provision, baseline levels of social
capital, human development outcomes like infant mortality or other relevant characteristics.
Short of detailed measures, we use district-level fixed effects in our analysis. Including fixed
effects for each of the 75 districts allows us to account for any unobserved and time-invariant
factors at the district level that might confound the relationship between violence and trust in
the national government.
Model specification
Our dependent variable is a typical Likert-scaled measure of trust in the national government
for each respondent. Trust yijk of each respondent i in VDC j, nested in district k, is modeled
as a linear function of covariates in the following way:
yijk ¼ aþbvjk þ x0uþ uk þ eijk
The parameter b estimates the effects of direct exposure to violence at the VDC level
(vjk). The vector x contains all the VDC and individual-level controls discussed in the previ-
ous section. The parameter uk represents district fixed effects, while eijk is the independently
and identically distributed error term. The inclusion of district fixed effects and the encom-
passing list of controls provides increased confidence that we can consistently estimate the
effects of the exposure to civil war violence. All models are estimated with standard ordinary
least squares (OLS) and we cluster standard errors at the district level to account for hetero-
skedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation within clusters.
Results
Note that our research design constitutes a difficult test for our hypothesis. Individual-level
survey data are characteristically very noisy and since the WHS survey did not sample from
regions with the highest levels of violence, it will be very difficult to precisely single out any
effects of political violence at the village level on political trust. Table 1 presents the results
for the main regression model. The model shows that of the control variables, in particular
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VDC population, respondent’s age, respondent’s education level and access to electricity, are
relevant predictors of political trust. As expected, higher population counts decrease trust in
the national government (statistically significant below the 10% level). Older respondents
show higher levels of trust in the national government, statistically significant below the 5%
level. More educated individuals trust the government less (statistically significant below the
0.1% level). Higher levels of education are likely to increase demands on government services
and performance, while at the same time increasing awareness about relative deprivation and
governmental failure. All three effects are in line with existing research and confirm the basic
validity of the model. Surprisingly, access to electricity has a negative effect on trust, but this
might be due to the fact that households with electricity also have higher socio-economic sta-
tus, with access to radio or television, increasing their demands on government services and
exposure to critical evaluations of government activity. Importantly though, none of the
other control variables attains statistical significance.6
Table 1. Trust in the national government
(1)
FE-OLS, clustered SE
log(Population) 20.0417+
(0.0222)
Income polarization 1.971
(1.220)
Poverty 20.336
(0.213)
Percentage of Nepali speakers 20.112
(0.139)
Percentage of higher caste 20.113
(0.188)
Age 0.00305*
(0.00140)
Gender 0.0217
(0.0300)
Education 20.0772***
(0.0177)
Voted 0.0269
(0.0388)
Piped water 20.0154
(0.0429)
Electricity 20.0807*
(0.0330)
Total killings 20.00897*
(0.00451)
Constant 2.761***
(0.320)
Observations 8348
Adjusted R2 0.017
F 14.01
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. FE, fixed effects; SE, standard error.
+ p\ 0.10, *p\ 0.05, **p\ 0.01, ***p\ 0.001.
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Now, turning to the test of our main hypothesis, the total number of killings in the VDC
has the expected sign. Exposure to civil war violence from 1997 to 2002 decreases trust in the
national government. The effect is statistically significant below the 5% level and indicates
support for the notion that citizens punish a disturbance of the monopoly of violence in their
own localities via local levels of trust in the national government. The substantive size of the
effect is also non-negligible: a 1 standard deviation increase in civil war violence is associated
with levels of trust in the national government approximately lower by 0.03 points on the
five-point scale. A respondent from a VDC with the lowest level of violence is expected to
have a level of trust into the national government about 0.2 points higher than a respondent
from a VDC with the highest level of violence—an 8% difference given the average level of
support.
Robustness checks
Although we control for a number of important covariates and include district fixed effects,
we also consider several additional checks to ascertain the robustness of our finding (the
Online Appendix provides detailed regression tables). First, we check the sensitivity of our
findings to changes in model specification. We repeat all our analyses using a measure of
exposure to violence that normalizes the level of killings by local VDC population size.
Doing so produces substantively identical results. We also alternatively estimate random
effects models, instead of fixed effects, without any impact on our main finding. Similarly,
controlling for media exposure by using information on access to a radio does not alter our
findings.
Second, we assess whether relying on a single survey item affects our main results. Relying
on a single survey question can produce spurious findings, because the risk of idiosyncratic
wording having an effect on our results is higher. The WHS does not contain an extensive
battery of political questions, but offers a few other questions that we can exploit for robust-
ness checks. Specifically, the survey also includes items eliciting levels of trust in local govern-
ment, an assessment of government responsiveness and levels of government repression. We
believe that the question on trust in local government, while aimed at a different level of gov-
ernment, can act as a useful alternative measure for the same concept. In fact, the questions
on trust in national and local government correlate at the 0.68 level, whereas the two other
measures ask about different concepts and show hardly any correlation with the trust items.
Repeating our main analysis with levels of trust in local government as our dependent vari-
able produces qualitatively similar results. For the main regression using total killings until
2002, the effect is still estimated to be negative, but fails to attain standard levels of statistical
significance. When we disaggregate the level of killings temporally though (see below), we
find very strong and statistically significant and negative effects for the initial levels of vio-
lence on trust in local government.
Third, we address potential endogeneity issues. While it is unlikely that simple reverse
causality affects the link between violence in the pre-ceasefire period and levels of trust mea-
sured in 2003, it could be the case that, for example, the Maoist rebels applied violence selec-
tively in villages with higher baseline levels of government trust. Conversely, most fighting
might have taken place in regions with high support for the Maoists and little trust in the
national government. We believe, however, that these concerns are largely unfounded. We
included a comprehensive list of individual-level and village-level controls that can act as
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confounding variables. Furthermore, all our models include district-level fixed effects.
Hence, any unobserved factors at the district-level (e.g. services provision by the district gov-
ernment, distance to the capital, baseline Maoist support, etc.) are accounted for and do not
interfere in our analysis of exposure to violence. Moreover, several pieces of evidence suggest
that selective use of violence across villages within districts did not occur. Our measure of
total killings contains killings of civilians by Maoists, but more importantly also fatalities
from encounters between rebels and government troops. The location of skirmishes between
insurgency and counter-insurgency forces within districts is unlikely to be tightly linked to
baseline levels of governmental trust, but is rather driven by tactical or other unrelated rea-
sons. In fact, Gilligan et al. (2011) point out that violence in the Nepalese civil war can be
characterized by a near-random and haphazard pattern. Owing to the difficult geography in
many of Nepal’s districts and the conflict strategy of the rebels, killings by Maoists reach
high levels in some locations, but remain low in many similar villages, solely for idiosyn-
cratic reasons. This implies that the degree of exposure to direct violence is in large parts dri-
ven by factors unrelated to political trust. Investigating associations between indicators of
the local population’s baseline support for the government and subsequent levels of killings,
our own data lend support to this argument. In our sample we observe no correlation
between total killings in the village and individual participation in the 1999 election, which
is an indirect indicator of prior government support. We also do not see any significant cor-
relation between killings in the village and turnout in the 1999 election measured at the dis-
trict level, a point that is also confirmed for district-level violence by Do and Iyer (2010).
To further probe the robustness of our fixed effects estimate, we implement a sensitivity
analysis following Bellows and Miguel (2008). They suggest a simple method that compares
the ‘‘full’’ regression estimates to a ‘‘sparse’’ model to identify a bound on the size of any
remaining omitted variable bias needed to invalidate our findings. To estimate the size of
the theoretical bias we have to compare our estimates for the effect of the violence across
different sets of regression models. Specifically, we take the estimate from our ‘‘full’’ specifi-
cation (all control variables and district fixed effects) and compare it with the estimate from
a ‘‘sparse’’ or ‘‘restricted’’ model, that only includes our violence variable and district fixed
effects. The ratio
dbfull
dbsparse dbfull
increases in the size of the estimated regression coefficient for the full model, which is the
conservative estimate of the effect, and decreases in the differences between regression coeffi-
cients between the conservative and more permissive model, that is, the degree to which
observable factors change the estimate. The higher the ratio, the larger the selection on unob-
servables must be to explain the estimated effect. We find that selection on unobservables
would have to be 89% of the variation explained by selection on observables to invalidate
our findings. This is close to the suggested rule-of-thumb threshold of 100% suggested by
Bellows and Miguel.
We also employ as a robustness check an instrumental variable strategy that exploits an
exogenous source of variation in the total level of killings. We identify two instruments to
explain variation in the total number of killings in each VDC. First, we use the minimum
distance from the respondent’s district to the closest of the districts in which the civil war
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violence initially started. Second, we use the level of elevation. The reasoning for the first
instrument is that districts closer to the outbreak of the Maoist rebellion had longer expo-
sure to civil war violence as the rebellion spread through parts of the country. Geographic
distance here proxies for the length of time regions were exposed to fighting between Maoist
forces and the government, which correlates with a higher casualty count.7 Similarly, villages
at lower levels of elevation were more accessible to government and rebel troops and thus
more likely to feature as locations of military incidents. In total, respondents close to the ini-
tial outbreak of violence and in more accessible villages are more likely to have experienced
higher levels of killings, as compared with respondents further away in remote locations. At
the same time, pure geographic distance to one of the initial districts and remoteness are
unlikely to have any effects on levels of political trust, other than through the exposure to
civil war violence.
We estimate two models, the first in which we include the log of the minimum distance
and log elevation levels as instruments, and the second in which we also add their interaction
term. In both models we include our standard set of covariates and district fixed effects—
which is important to block alternative channels from the instrument to our outcome vari-
able. We also cluster standard errors at the district level. Table 2 reports our results. First
note that, in both models, the Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistics lie below the rule of thumb
threshold of 10, that is, our estimates might suffer from weak instrument bias (Stock et al.,
2002). At the same time, the values of the Hansen J statistic indicate that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments, which lends support to our assumptions about
the validity of the instrument. In model 1 of Table 2 the estimated coefficient for total vio-
lence is negative and statistically significant below the 10% level. In model 2 of Table 2, in
which we add the interaction term between minimum distance and elevation, statistical sig-
nificance is below the 5% level. Note that the size of the coefficient for violence is larger than
in the initial fixed effects models, suggesting that we were underestimating the magnitude of
the effect of violence on trust. Both results confirm our initial findings and lend support to
our main hypothesis. Even when leveraging exogenous variation in the total exposure to vio-
lence, we find a negative association between civil war violence and trust in the national
government.
Our fourth and last robustness check aims at shedding some light on the divergence of
results of our analysis and previous studies. While we find a clear negative effect of political
violence on trust in the government, others have found a positive association. As argued
above, we believe that timing may account for some of this seeming contradiction. We have
used survey data collected in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, whereas previous stud-
ies have used data from surveys undertaken several years after the end of violence. We have
argued above that such a time-gap between the end of a civil war and the date of the opinion
survey may affect empirical findings, as processes of peace- and state-building can shape
associations between exposure to violence and political attitudes.
Importantly though, while our study focuses on levels of trust in the immediate post-
ceasefire period, we have so far not accounted for the timing of violence before the ceasefire.
Some respondents might have been exposed to violence early on, while others only experi-
ence clashes between government forces and Maoist rebels right before the ceasefire.
Victimization that happened long ago may produce different effects of violence on trust
through a longer-term process of personal recounting of and coping with war-time experi-
ences. Effects of violence might, however, be different when memories of violence are still
fresh. Hence, there might be two important processes of timing at work in shaping the
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relationship between exposure to violence and political trust: the number of ‘‘peace years’’
and associated peace-building and the time lapsed since the last exposure to violence. While
our study by design is able to identify effects of violence on trust without the influence of
postwar reconstruction and peace-building efforts, we can only start to disentangle to poten-
tially varying effects of the level of temporal closeness between exposure to violence and
measurement of trust.
As a first step we make use of the high level of temporal disaggregation of the INSEC
fatalities data. As the data report killings for each year separately, we are able to distinguish
between the effects of early civil war violence—more than six years before the survey was
undertaken—and the most recent exposure in the year preceding the survey. Table 3 reports
the estimated coefficients and standard errors for our main model, but temporally disaggre-
gates levels of violence.
We find evidence for temporal differences in the exposure to violence. Coefficients and
errors vary substantially across the models. Models 1 and 6 in Table 3 indicate that
Table 2. Trust in the national government, IV
(1) (2)
2SLS-FE 2SLS-FE, clustered SE
log(Population) 0.0913 0.107
(0.0801) (0.0766)
Income polarization 1.979 1.969
(1.807) (1.901)
Poverty 20.240 20.228
(0.272) (0.282)
Percentage Nepali speakers 0.0426 0.0617
(0.151) (0.164)
Percentage higher caste 20.196 20.208
(0.202) (0.214)
Age 0.00314* 0.00315*
(0.00140) (0.00141)
Gender 0.0244 0.0244
(0.0307) (0.0309)
Education 20.0710*** 20.0705***
(0.0172) (0.0174)
Voted 0.0154 0.0143
(0.0402) (0.0405)
Piped water 20.0255 20.0268
(0.0453) (0.0461)
Electricity 20.0902* 20.0902*
(0.0357) (0.0364)
Total killings 20.0753+ 20.0830*
(0.0416) (0.0403)
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic 3.41 3.67
Hansen J statistic 1.143 1.49
Observations 8198 8198
Adjusted R2 20.008 20.012
F 12.12 11.89
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 2SLS, Two-stage least squares.
+ p\ 0.10, *p\ 0.05, **p\ 0.01, ***p\ 0.001.
16 Conflict Management and Peace Science
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 19, 2015cmp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
T
a
b
le
3
.
Tr
u
st
in
th
e
n
at
io
n
al
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
lo
g(
Po
pu
la
tio
n)
2
0
.0
5
8
1
*
*
2
0
.0
6
0
4
*
*
2
0
.0
5
9
0
*
*
2
0
.0
6
4
1
*
*
2
0
.0
5
9
0
*
2
0
.0
3
4
2
2
0
.0
4
0
0
(0
.0
2
0
0
)
(0
.0
2
0
0
)
(0
.0
1
9
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
3
)
(0
.0
2
6
0
)
(0
.0
2
2
2
)
(0
.0
2
4
1
)
In
co
m
e
po
la
ri
za
tio
n
1
.8
7
1
2
.0
2
2
+
1
.9
1
4
1
.9
8
7
+
1
.9
8
7
1
.9
3
2
1
.7
9
2
(1
.2
1
1
)
(1
.1
4
9
)
(1
.2
0
6
)
(1
.1
5
2
)
(1
.2
0
3
)
(1
.2
2
4
)
(1
.1
7
4
)
Po
ve
rt
y
2
0
.3
6
2
+
2
0
.3
4
1
2
0
.3
6
4
+
2
0
.3
4
4
2
0
.3
4
8
2
0
.3
1
7
2
0
.3
3
0
(0
.2
1
2
)
(0
.2
1
9
)
(0
.2
0
7
)
(0
.2
1
4
)
(0
.2
1
6
)
(0
.2
1
5
)
(0
.2
1
5
)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
N
ep
al
is
pe
ak
er
s
2
0
.1
4
2
2
0
.1
4
3
2
0
.1
1
7
2
0
.1
6
9
2
0
.1
3
4
2
0
.1
2
0
2
0
.1
7
0
(0
.1
3
8
)
(0
.1
4
4
)
(0
.1
3
4
)
(0
.1
4
4
)
(0
.1
3
7
)
(0
.1
3
8
)
(0
.1
5
6
)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
hi
gh
er
ca
st
e
2
0
.0
8
4
6
2
0
.0
9
4
7
2
0
.1
1
0
2
0
.0
6
6
5
2
0
.0
9
9
0
2
0
.1
0
3
2
0
.0
5
2
6
(0
.1
9
0
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
(0
.1
8
8
)
(0
.1
9
8
)
(0
.1
8
8
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
(0
.2
0
9
)
A
ge
0
.0
0
3
0
3
*
0
.0
0
3
0
2
*
0
.0
0
3
0
5
*
0
.0
0
3
0
4
*
0
.0
0
30
3
*
0
.0
0
3
0
5
*
0
.0
0
3
0
4
*
(0
.0
0
1
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
9
)
G
en
de
r
0
.0
2
1
4
0
.0
2
1
2
0
.0
2
1
7
0
.0
2
1
7
0
.0
2
16
0
.0
2
1
7
0
.0
2
1
2
(0
.0
2
9
9
)
(0
.0
3
0
0
)
(0
.0
2
9
9
)
(0
.0
2
9
9
)
(0
.0
2
9
9
)
(0
.0
3
0
0
)
(0
.0
2
9
9
)
E
du
ca
tio
n
2
0
.0
7
7
6
*
*
*
2
0
.0
7
8
0
*
*
*
2
0
.0
7
7
8
*
*
*
2
0
.0
7
7
9
*
*
*
2
0
.0
7
7
7
*
*
*
2
0
.0
7
7
1
*
*
*
2
0
.0
7
7
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
7
6
)
(0
.0
1
8
0
)
(0
.0
1
7
6
)
(0
.0
1
7
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
8
1
)
Vo
te
d
0
.0
2
8
0
0
.0
2
8
3
0
.0
2
7
9
0
.0
2
8
4
0
.0
2
80
0
.0
2
5
9
0
.0
2
6
4
(0
.0
3
8
4
)
(0
.0
3
8
5
)
(0
.0
3
8
4
)
(0
.0
3
8
5
)
(0
.0
3
8
5
)
(0
.0
3
8
7
)
(0
.0
3
8
6
)
Pi
pe
d
w
at
er
2
0
.0
1
3
7
2
0
.0
1
3
7
2
0
.0
1
3
7
2
0
.0
1
2
2
2
0
.0
1
4
0
2
0
.0
1
4
9
2
0
.0
1
1
6
(0
.0
4
2
9
)
(0
.0
4
2
9
)
(0
.0
4
3
1
)
(0
.0
4
2
4
)
(0
.0
4
2
8
)
(0
.0
4
2
6
)
(0
.0
4
2
1
)
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
2
0
.0
8
0
9
*
2
0
.0
7
9
9
*
2
0
.0
8
1
0
*
2
0
.0
7
9
9
*
2
0
.0
8
0
7
*
2
0
.0
7
9
7
*
2
0
.0
7
7
5
*
(0
.0
3
2
9
)
(0
.0
3
2
6
)
(0
.0
3
2
7
)
(0
.0
3
2
8
)
(0
.0
3
2
8
)
(0
.0
3
3
0
)
(0
.0
3
2
9
)
K
ill
in
gs
1
9
9
7
2
0
.1
7
9
*
*
2
0
.1
9
3
*
(0
.0
5
4
9
)
(0
.0
8
5
8
)
K
ill
in
gs
1
9
9
8
0
.0
2
7
0
0
.0
4
9
1
(0
.0
6
6
3
)
(0
.0
8
0
9
)
K
ill
in
gs
1
9
9
9
2
0
.0
7
4
2
2
0
.0
6
5
6
(0
.0
7
7
2
)
(0
.0
8
7
3
)
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
De Juan and Pierskalla 17
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 19, 2015cmp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
T
a
b
le
3
.
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
FE
-O
LS
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
SE
K
ill
in
gs
2
0
0
0
0
.0
3
6
8
0
.0
4
0
8
(0
.0
3
1
7
)
(0
.0
3
3
6
)
K
ill
in
gs
2
0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
0
8
0
.0
0
7
2
7
(0
.0
2
3
1
)
(0
.0
2
9
1
)
K
ill
in
gs
2
0
0
2
2
0
.0
2
0
4
*
2
0
.0
2
2
4
+
(0
.0
0
9
5
8
)
(0
.0
1
3
2
)
C
o
n
st
an
t
2
.9
2
4
*
*
*
2
.9
1
5
*
*
*
2
.9
2
4
*
*
*
2
.9
5
3
*
*
*
2
.9
0
8
*
*
*
2
.7
0
2
*
*
*
2
.7
8
4
*
*
*
(0
.2
8
9
)
(0
.2
8
8
)
(0
.2
9
1
)
(0
.2
8
7
)
(0
.3
6
3
)
(0
.3
0
1
)
(0
.3
4
9
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
8
3
4
8
8
3
4
8
8
3
4
8
8
3
4
8
8
3
4
8
8
3
4
8
8
3
4
8
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
1
8
F
3
5
.3
9
1
3
.2
6
1
1
.8
8
1
1
.7
6
1
1
.9
6
1
2
.8
4
6
8
.8
3
C
lu
st
er
ed
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
+
p
\
0
.1
0
,*
p
\
0
.0
5,
*
*
p
\
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
\
0
.0
01
.
18 Conflict Management and Peace Science
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 19, 2015cmp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
especially the initial and—to a lesser extent—the most recent experiences matter most for
levels of trust in the national government in the expected way. Killings in the years 1998–
2001 are not found to have any statistically significant impact on political trust. Model 7 in
Table 3 includes all violence variables simultaneously and confirms this pattern.8 We also
estimate models 1–6 in Table 3 using our set of instruments. Doing so, we find even stronger
evidence for the negative effects of violence at the beginning of the conflict, as well as the
most recent year.9 While overall lending clear support for a negative association between
exposure to violence and political trust in an immediate postwar setting, this set of findings
also suggests a more nuanced role of violence for the formation of political attitudes. Future
research will have to investigate further the temporal effects of exposure to violence and
entertain more specific explanations for this pattern. For now, however, our final robustness
check lends some support to our assumption that varying levels of temporal closeness of
exposure to violence and measurement of trust alone cannot explain the difference between
our findings and results of previous studies.
Conclusion
Civil wars can shape social and political perceptions. Our analysis of the effects of violence
on political trust in Nepal speaks to previous findings on the role of victimization for social
capital and cohesion: the more people are exposed to violence, the more probable are lower
levels of trust in the government when the war ends. The more people experience the material
and human costs of violence, the more negatively they will evaluate the government’s failure
to curb rebellion, as well as the consequences of violent government action itself.
These findings differ from results of previous studies finding positive associations
between exposure to violence and trust. We believe that this seeming contradiction can at
least partly be explained by the fact that research has thus far mainly concentrated on
long-term effects of civil-war violence, while we have explicitly concentrated on the role
of violence in trust in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire. More specifically, we have
argued that processes of peace- and state-building can affect associations between war-
time experiences and postwar political attitudes and empirical attention to the immediate
postwar context is warranted. Furthermore, our study explicitly focuses on trust in the
national government, while many other studies instead analyze interpersonal or general
measures of trust or social capital.
Future analyses will have to provide additional evidence on the effects of exposure to
political violence. First, analyses based on multiple waves of opinion surveys may help shed
light on the exact role of timing for associations between violence and trust. Our analysis
relies on a specific type of violence, notably exposure to aggregate levels of killing. Future
studies may perform comparable analyses on the effects of exposure to governmental or
rebel violence. Second, our findings are based on analysis of one single case study. The civil
war in Nepal may display some specific characteristics not found in other contexts. This can
in turn reduce the possibility of generalizing our findings to other cases. Finally, our analysis
is based on a survey item that asks for people’s trust in national government.
Operationalizations of political trust that differentiate between various state institutions or
elements of trust such as confidence in policies or capacities may contribute to understand-
ing associations between violence and political trust.
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Notes
1. Political trust is not the same as legitimacy. However, both concepts are intertwined. The less peo-
ple trust in various political institutions, the higher the chance is of them perceiving the state to be
illegitimate (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011; Newton, 2006; Sacks and Larizza, 2012). More specifi-
cally, political trust has been conceived as an antecedent normative condition of value-based legiti-
macy: the more people believe that the government is able and willing to deliver on its promises,
the more likely they are to willingly obey the government’s rules and regulations (Levi et al., 2009).
2. The exact formulation of the respective survey item reads as follows: ‘‘How much of the time do
you think you can trust the NATIONAL government to do what is right? Every person will have a
definition of what is right. For some it may be passing an abortion law, while for others it will be
passing an anti-abortion one. Respondents may think about how the government deals with vio-
lence, corruption, drugs, crime, as well how permissive it is and how much it defends the interest
of the citizens.’’
3. Violence in 1996 is actually taking place in VDCs not in our sample, owing to WHS respondents’
locations.
4. Since these variables are measured after the first part of the civil war, they are post-treatment mea-
sures and considered ‘‘bad controls’’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 66). Importantly though, none
of our findings depend on the inclusion or exclusion of these measures.
5. Ideally, we would like to include additional measures of caste status at the individual level, but the
WHS survey codebook does not let us identify high status castes from the numeric codes.
6. The estimated negative sign for the percentage of Nepali speakers and higher castes goes against
expectations, but is far from standard levels of statistical significance, that is, not distinguishable
from zero.
7. The Online Appendix provides maps for each year from 1997 to 2002, showing the geographic dis-
tribution of violence. Available at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/7ggk0pf3139zj6h/NepalTrust
Appendix.pdf
8. The substantive effect size is similar. Although the coefficients differ dramatically, the difference in
the level of killings between 1997 and 1997–2002 compensates proportionally.
9. Interestingly, in the 2SLS-IV models we also find a positive and statistically significant effect for
violence in 2001, which coincides with initial attempts for a peace agreement.
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